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NOTES
EQUITY DECREES AND THEIR STANDING IN SISTER
STATES*
Great improvement has been made in procedure in our country in
recent decades. Rules pertaining to the bringing of suits and the
conduct of trials have been greatly simplified. In conjunction with
this progress the blurred distinctions between law and equity have
been narrowed, and many states have abolished the separate courts
of equity. Others have gone even further along these lines and
have entirely abolished the distinction between legal proceedings and
equitable actions. Whether these attempts have been successful is
beyond the scope of this discussion. Changes are still being made
in procedure, and perhaps in not too great a period of time the de-
marcation between equitable and legal relief will be of historical in-
terest only. However, that time has not arrived, and one proof of
this lies in the failure of many courts to respect properly the equity
decrees of another state.
Suppose a court issues a decree ordering a defendant to perform
a specified act, such as opening a drainage ditch. Must a court of
another state recognize this decree under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause by way of defense, or by allowing suit to be brought on it?
The history of the Full Faith and Credit Clause fails to reveal
any intent ol the part of its framers to limit its operation to judg-
ments of law courts. The term "judicial proceedings" appeared in
the Articles of Confederation, as well as in the various proposals
submitted to the Constitutional Convention. Since this broad term
was inserted in the clause, it would seem that the framers intended
that all types of legal proceedings, and not just those of law courts,
were to receive due respect. Moreover, there has never been any
classification of judicial proceedings by the Congress. Therefore
one would expect to find full faith and credit being given all judicial
determinations. Such has not been and is not now the case. Equity
decrees have not been treated in the same manner as law judgments.
At the outset it should be pointed out that there are two well-
known types of decrees which are given recognition-in fact the
Supreme Court requires that they be accorded the privileges of Ar-
OThis article is a modified portion of a thesis submitted to the faculty of the Law
School, Yale University, in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the
Science of Law.
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ticle IV, Section 1, of the Constitution. One of these is the divorce
decree. The other type for which the Supreme Court requires comi-
ty is the decree calling for the payment of money.' There was con-
siderable authority for enforcing money decrees even before the
problem came before the Supreme Court. In an early English case
it was held that no action would lie on a decree for the payment of
money.2 A number of reasons were given for the holding; the fore-
most one being that the decree did not give rise to a common law
debt. The inadequacy of the assigned reasons, and in particular the
stated one, resulted in a subsequent holding to the effect that suit
would lie on such a decree.3
The enforcement of a foreign money decree was sought in a New
York court even before the matter arose in England. In 1805 a
party who had obtained a money decree in New Jersey sued on it
in New York and the latter court held that the plaintiff could recover. 4
This case was the beginning of a trend that has remained practically
unbroken in the United States. In 1858, in Barber v. Barber5 the
Supreme Court of the United States extended the protection of Ar-
ticle IV, Section 1, to such judicial proceedings. In the Barber case
a federal district court in Wisconsin was directed to enforce a New
York alimony decree. The Supreme Court stated:
The decree . . . is a judgment of record, and will be received
as such by other courts. And such a judgment or decree, ren-
dered in any State of the United States, the court having juris-
diction, will be carried to judgment in any other State, to have
there the same binding force that it has in the State in which it
was originally given.
6
That money decrees are to be awarded full faith and credit has been
reiterated in a number of subsequent cases. 7 The only real difficulty
encountered with such orders is determining whether they are final,
since full faith and credit is only required for final decrees.3 Of
. 1. R. g., Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S.
183 (1901) ; and Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858). These cases are
discussed below. In general see Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land
Decrees, 21 CHIc. L. R. 620 (1953-1954).
2. Carpenter v. Thornton, 3 B. & Ald. 52 (1819).
3. Henley v. Soper, 8 B. & C. 16 (1828).
4. Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines 22 (N.Y. 1805).
5. 21 How. 582 (U.S. 1858).
6. Id. at 591.
7. Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1
(1910) ; and Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
8. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910). The requirement of finality is
discussed in Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A.
L. Rv. 441, 462 (1955).
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course the money decree is not enforceable in another state if it is
subject to collateral attack upon a recognized ground.9
There is doubt as to whether other types of equity decrees must be
enforced. No firm ruling has been given by the Supreme Court al-
though one is needed. The case of Fall v. Eastin1 ° is in point. In
this case the husband in a divorce proceeding brought by the wife
was ordered by a Washington court to convey Nebraska land to his
wife, the court having judicial jurisdiction over him. The husband
escaped the jurisdiction of the Washington court without abiding by
the decree. He mortgaged and later conveyed the property to a
third party. A deed was executed by a Washington official pursu-
ant to court order. Thereafter the wife brought suit in Nebraska
setting up the Washington decree and praying that her title be
quieted by the cancellation of the deed and mortgage. Nebraska
denied relief and this was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Holmes concurred specially. 1 ' He was of the opinion
that the Washington decree imposed a duty on the defendant which
could be enforced elsewhere. However, the Justice did not think
that the Washington decree had to be treated as cutting off the rights
of the Nebraska purchaser. He did not make it clear whether this
question would be governed by the internal law of Washington or
that of Nebraska. Should not the priority question be controlled by
the local law of Nebraska?
The Fall case is not noted for its clarity, and it is difficult to de-
termine the exact ground upon which the court held that full faith
and credit did not have to be given the decree. Therefore, advocates
for and against the recognition of foreign equity decrees find support
and comfort in the decision. In the first place respect for the Wash-
ington deed was sought. It would appear that it did not have to be
recognized because the owner did not execute it and because the land
was not located in Washington. 12  However, the court did deal
specifically with the question in its opinion.
There was also apparently a contention by the plaintiff that the
Washington decree should be regarded as operating directly on the
Nebraska land. A holding to this effect would provide greater re-
spect for judicial proceedings than that required in the past. This
allegation was likewise discussed by the Supreme Court and it was
9. See a discussion of the grounds for collateral attack in Sumner, op. cit.
.supra note 8 at 464.
10. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
11. Id. at 14.
12. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
[Vol. 8
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pointed out that the Washington decree need not be treated as a
source of title by Nebraska.
Full faith and credit, or conclusive effect, was also sought for the
Washington decree. The original owner and the remote grantee
were made parties defendant. Since the third party, the remote
grantee, was not a part to the Washington suit he was not bound
by it even though subject to the judicial jurisdiction of the second
court. Although the owner was before the court in the first pro-
ceeding, he was not served with process nor present in the Nebraska
suit. Therefore the Washington decree could not be enforced
against him. However, if the land, the res, was before the Ne-
braska court, the Washington order could have been applied to it.
The facts are not clear as to whether there was judicial jurisdiction
over the land. Whether the same result would have been reached
had a third party not been involved and if the land bad been before
the court is conjecturable.
There is yet another factor that was present in the Fall case which
renders it bad precedent on the question of the credit to be paid
equity decrees. The Washington decree purported to divide real
property between husband and wife in a divorce proceeding. This
type of relief was not available in Nebraska. Consequently, by ask-
ing for enforcement of the equity order, the plaintiff was seeking
relief unavailable in Nebraska. Prior to this case it had been es-
tablished that a state need not rearrange its judicial system in order
to meet its constitutional obligations. 13 However, the full faith and
credit issue was squarely presented to the court, and it did hold that
the Washington decree was not entitled to constitutional protection.
No case has been decided by the Supreme Court since Fall v. Eastin
which involved this point. It is difficult to understand why the prob-
lem has not once been before the court in the supervening years.
However, despite, or in view of Fall v. Eastin, many of our courts
accord to equity decrees the same courtesy as they give law judg-
ments.14 But even today there are many courts which refuse to pay
the same respect to equity decrees that they are required by the Su-
preme Court to give to law judgments. A number of reasons have
been given to justify this discrimination.
One is that, historically, there was and is no known procedure for
the enforcement of personal decrees rendered in equity. When this
reason is given, the authorities point out that the decree is nothing
13. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373
(1903).
14. STUMBMRG, CONFLIcr O LAWS 123-130 (2d ed. 1951).
1955]
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more than a form of execution of a personal duty. Dean Pound dis-
cussed this in one of his early articles. He stated:
The analogy of enforcement of foreign judgments and of for-
eign money decrees on which they chiefly rely does not seem
to me in point. Under modern statutes allowing enforcement
of money decrees by execution they are on the same basis as
money judgments. But it is to be noted that it is only money
judgments that are enforced abroad, and that this 'enforcement
of the judgment' is a dogmatic fiction... In our law the debt
sued on was merged in the judgment. Hence in legal theory
the original claim no longer existed, and in order to allow it
to be asserted abroad it became necessary to invoke a 'quasi-con-
tractual' obligation to pay the judgment. But in equity the suit
is to compel defendant to do his duty, and that duty is not neces-
sarily merged in the decree, so that if the decree fails of effect,
an action may still be brought upon plaintiff's legal right, if he
has one. Thus there was never any necessity for proceeding
subsequently on a theory of enforcing the decree rather than the
original claim.'
5
The statement by Dean Pound pretty well sets forth the argument
usually given to support the view that equity decrees should not get
extra-state enforcement. The short answer to this argument is that
no new and unknown remedy is being sought. All that the second
court is being asked to do is to require a person to render, or refrain
from doing, an act, the merits of the controversy having already been
determined by a sister state court. The relief that is sought is the
type of relief that courts grant every day. Thus it is not unique.
The only way in which the proceeding differs from an original ac-
tion is that there is no necessity to hear the evidence nor to make
a determination on the merits. This has been done by another com-
petent tribunal.
Those courts which refuse to give full faith and credit to many
equitable decrees do give conclusive effect to divorce decrees and
those calling for the payment of money. If there is no procedure
for the enforcement of equity decrees, there would seem to be no way
in which to give conclusive effect to the two types mentioned. Yet lack
of procedure is not mentioned by these courts. While it is true that
divorce decrees arc usually submitted as defenses, the fact remains
that decrees for the payment of money are used as causes of action.
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Since remedies are found for them, remedies would seem to be avail-
able for those dealing with other things.
A second reason that is frequently given for not enforcing an
equity decision of another state is that a decree in equity does not
operate upon the matter in question, but rather it only binds the
person to obedience to the rendering Chancellor. This reason was
stated at an early date in the following manner:
A decree is not like a judgment of the King's Bench or Common
Bench, for such a judgment binds the right of the party; but a
decree does not bind the right but only the person to obedience,
so that if the party will not obey then the Chancellor may commit
him to prison until he will obey, and this is all that the Chan-
cellor can do.
16
So firmly embedded in some of our legal systems is this view that
it has been held that a decree cannot even be enforced in another
court located in the same state.17 In Bullock v. Bullock it was said:
It is a misuse of terms to call the burden thereby imposed on
respondent a 'personal obligation'. At the most, the decree and
order imposed a duty on him, which duty he owed to the court
making them. That court can enforce the duty by its process,
but our courts cannot be required to issue such process, or to
make our decrees operate as process.'
8
These arguments have been well answered by two authorities who
contend that the orders of a court of equity do have the same effect
as those of a law court. One said:
Is it not time for judges and writers to stop talking language
suitable to the time of Coke in discussing the power of equity,
and to recognize that a court of equity is a legal tribunal with
powers to adjudicate and settle controversies as finally as a court
of law? 19
And the other authority wrote that statements which assume the
correctness of the distinction between orders of law courts and of
equity assume "that equity has made no progress since the time of
Coke". 20 Even assuming that differences are present, all courts en-
16. Y.B. 27H. VIII 14, 6.
17. 3 BrAx, SummARY OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 537 (1902).
18. 52 N.J. Eq. 561, 30 AtI. 676, 679 (1894).
19. Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 COL. L. R. 228, 233 (1915).
20. Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree, 17 MIcH.
L. R. 527, 529 (1919).
6
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force decrees calling for the payment of money -as a matter of fact
they are required to do so. How can those authorities, who contend
that the decree is nothing more than a personal obligation - or form
of execution - which is owed to the court, reconcile the fact that
money decrees are treated differently? The justification given is
that the new obligation created where a payment of money is called
for arises not from principles of equity, but from the operation of
legislation which has placed money decrees upon the same basis as
judgments at law. In other words, the rendering state has taken
steps through its legislature to place money decrees in the same
bracket as law judgments, and hence they are treated the same else-
where. While this is a plausible answer, it is absolutely untrue. No
such distinction has ever been made in the cases. If this were the
reason for the irreconcilable treatment, would it not be given in at
least a few of the decisions? Moreover, the legislation referred to
simply renders the decree of chancery equal to a law judgment. No
classification of decrees is found in the statutes, and none should be
made by the courts. If decrees are given statutory advantages which
they did not previously enjoy, such advantages should accrue to the
benefit of all, and not just certain ones, unless the statute provides
otherwise.
It has been pointed out that those states which generally deny
extra-territorial effect to decrees other than money orders, enforce
those based upon a consensual relationship. In other words, if there
was a contract or some sort of voluntary agreement upon which the
order was based, a decree is given greater validity than it would
otherwise get.2 ' Quite necessarily this involves investigation of the
original cause of action. For purposes of full faith and credit, the
Supreme Court has held that the merits cannot be overhauled when
there is a judgment at issue.2 2 Since an equitable decree is a pro-
duct of a determination on the merits, a second court should likewise
be precluded from inquiring into the merits upon which the order
was based. Dean Pound's statement28 that there is no merger with
a decree is a conclusion-not a justification. No reason can be
given for not applying the principle of res judicata to all types of
judicial decisions. As a matter of fact, in one situation the doctrine
of res judicata is held to be applicable. If a court refuses to grant
a requested decree and renders a decision for the defendant, any at-
tempt thereafter by the plaintiff to obtain relief on the same facts is
21. Note, 21 HARv. L. R. 210 (1907-8).
22. See Fauntleroy v. Lur, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
23. See note 15 supra.
[Vol. 8
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barred under the doctrine. If litigation is to be cut off once there has
been a judicial determination against the plaintiff, it should be ter-
minated where the ruling was in favor of the plaintiff. As previous-
ly indicated, one of the purposes of the comity clause is to prevent
the retrial of issues that have been adjudicated.2 Society is inter-
ested in giving each party his day in court, and the question of
whether there can be a subsequent litigation is not, or should not be,
determined by the factor of who won in the original suit. Some
courts follow the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires
that an equitable decree be regarded as prinua facie evidence of the
initial claim rather than conclusive evidence of it.2 5 This contention
closely parallels that conduct which was permitted under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation, and under the original interpretation given
Article IV, Section 1, of our Constitution.2 6 It has long been settled
that the latter requires that a judgment be treated as a conclusive de-
cision on the merits. There is no apparent basis for requiring less
faith for a decree because it is one of equity. If any credence for
it is required, it is the credence demanded by the clause and federal
act- a conclusive one. Moreover, this type of respect is given to
money decrees. It would seem to follow that a decision ordering the
defendant to do or refrain from doing an act should be regarded as
conclusive as a decision calling for the payment of money. And it
should be noted that the courts are not being asked to enforce an
original obligation. What is wanted is the enforcement of the de-
cree and therefore we are not concerned with the cause of action.
The courts do not look behind money decrees to see if there was an
antecedent obligation. If the courts do not go behind them, why
should they go behind others? Also there is the point that all de-
crees are based upon some obligation which society deems to be owed
by the defendant. What difference should it make because one court
seeks to enforce the obligation by decreeing the payment of money,
while in another instance some other act might be ordered as a dis-
charge of the obligation?
While it has been demonstrated that the presence or absence of a
consensual relationship determines whether a decree is to receive
faith and credit in some courts,27 this reasoning does not appear in
the decisions. But irrespective of whether this basis is consciously
or unconsciously used, it is not a proper criterion.
24. See Sumner, The Full Faith and Credit Clause - Its History and Purpose,
34 OR. L. R. 224, 249 (1955).
25. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 636-642 (3d ed. 1949).
26. See Sumner, op. cit. supra note 8 at 442.
27. See note 21 supra.
1955]
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A great percentage, if not most, of the decrees which courts are
asked to enforce are ones involving land situated in the second state.
There is anything but unanimity among the courts as to the respect
to be accorded land decrees. In fact it has been discovered that there
are some seven different approaches to this problem taken by the
courts.2 8 Some of our courts refuse to give full faith and credit to
land decrees. Especially is this true when the land is located in the
second forum state.
The reason given by the courts for their refusal to enforce foreign
land decrees is to prevent a foreign court from interfering with land
situated in another state. Now it cannot be doubted that each state
has absolute control over real property located within its borders.
This was not only true historically, but is a recognized principle to-
day.29 So firmly established is this doctrine that it is surprising that
all suits involving real property have not been made local actions.
However, it has been decreed otherwise in the interest of society.
While most of our courts give conclusive effect today to foreign de-
crees even though they concern local land, others dogmatically refuse
to do so. However, it is interesting to note that practically all courts
having judicial jurisdiction over a defendant will order him in the
proper instance to execute a deed to foreign realty. This they will do
even though they refuse to order the doing of other acts which would
have extra-territorial effect. As a matter of fact, this practice has
been allowed since the case of Penn v. Lord Baltimore,30 decided in
1750. In that case the court in its decree ordering the execution of
the deed, made the following statement:
The conscience of the party was bound by this agreement; and
being within the jurisdiction of this court . . . , which acts in
personam, the court may properly decree it or an agreement.31
And in an early case in this country the power of a court to issue
such a decree was upheld, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall remarking:
. . . the principles of equity give a court jurisdiction wherever
the person may be found, and the circumstance, that a question
of title may be involved in the inquiry and may even constitute
the essential point on which the case depends, does not seem
sufficient to arrest that jurisdiction.
3 2
28. CHA-EE, SIM.lPSON AND MALONEY, CASES ON EQUITY 103 (3d ed. 1951).
Also see Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 CnIc.
L. R. 620 (1953-1954).
29. See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 217 (1933).
30. 1 Ves. Sr. 444 (1750).
31. Id. at 447.
32. See Massie v. Watts, 6 Cr. 148, 158 (U.S. 1810).
[Vol. 8
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Not only will the courts in this country require a defendant to
execute a deed to property located elsewhere in the proper instance,
but such deeds are almost universally recognized. That this affects
land in another state cannot be denied. As a matter of fact, obedi-
ence to the court order results in a direct effect upon foreign land.
Now with a decree for the conveyance of land situated in another
state, the decree itself does not affect title to the land. No one would
contend this. At most an obligation is imposed on the defendant.
As pointed out above, this is not just an obligation or duty deemed
to be owed to the rendering court, but one which is established on'
the defendant and one which should be recognized by other tribunals.
When suit is brought on the decree elsewhere, the second court is
not asked to look upon the decree as affecting title, but as having
established a duty on the defendant. It is this judicially decreed
duty for which enforcement is sought. If the duty had been based
on a tort claim, contract, etc., it would be enforced. Since the decree
imposed a duty on the defendant to convey, that duty should be en-
forced, and the second court should not be permitted to go behind
the decrees to determine if there was a consensual relationship, etc.
Res judicata should apply with as much force to a determination in
equity as in law, as discussed above. This was the basis of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes' concurring opinion in Fall v. Eastin.33 He stated:
If the husband had made a contract, valid by the law of Washing-
ton, to do the same thing, I think there is no doubt that the con-
tract would have been binding in Nebraska ... so I conceive
that a Washington decree for the specific performance, such a
contract would be entitled to full faith and credit as between the
parties in Nebraska. But it does not matter to its constitutional
effect what the ground of the decree may be, whether contract
or something else .... A personal decree is equally within the
jurisdiction of a court having the person within its power, what-
ever its ground and% whatever it orders the defendant to do :4
But suppose a third party, a purchaser of the land, enters the
picture as was true in Fall v. Eastin. What effect does this have?
The presence of this additional party should not change the conclu-
sions expressed above, and the decree should be recognized. How-
ever, since there is another claimant of the land, the state should de-
termine whether the third party is to prevail over the holder of the
decree. This raises no new problem. It presents nothing more than
33. 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
34. Id. at 14 (concurring opn.).
1955]
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a problem of priority as between competing claimants to land, and
the courts are confronted with these problems every day. As to which
party should prevail is a question that can be answered under the
recording or priority statutes found in the state wherein the land lies.3s
The reasons which have been discussed on the foregoing pages are
the ones usually given by the courts which refuse to enforce the
equity decrees of other tribunals. However, there are a few other
grounds which are occasionally stated. One of these is that one.
court will not adhere to the decree of another because to do so would
permit the control of local suits by a foreign court. Obviously this
reason is used to justify a refusal to recognize a foreign decree en-
joining the defendant from prosecuting a suit elsewhere. This ex-
cuse is not relevant to other types of equitable orders. Decrees
restraining the bringing of suit elsewhere are frequently awarded in
order to prevent vexatious suits, the perpetration of fraud on other
courts, the bringing of suit in an inconvenient forum, etc. Although
there is a problem as to whether such an injunction should be ren-
dered, the greater problem is whether such a decree will be recog-
nized in another place. There has been no ruling by the Supreme
Court on whether such a decree is entitled to full faith and credit,
however, the court has denied certiorari in two cases where it was not
accorded. 36  Most states refuse to recognize and enforce them. On
the other hand, respect is accorded by several states and they are
received as a ground for dismissal.37 The unsoundness of the reason-
ing given for not recognizing decrees enjoining suit was well ans-
wered by Justice Taylor of the Illinois Appellate Court in Allen v.
Chicago Great Western R. R.:
In considering the matter generally, it may be asked why, in
such a case, without good and sufficient reason ignore the judicial
command of the district court of a sister state. What, in such
a matter, does comity mean, if not reasonable mutual recognition
and sanction of each other's courts and their legitimate and au-
thenticated judicial' processes. A judgment of a foreign State
may be sued upon. It is recognized as a legal result, and has
certain binding and substantial qualities. And why should not
an injunction pendente lite, a direct command to a resident of
the State in which the Court issues the injunction, sits, also, in
35. Ibid.
36. Kepner v. C. C. C. & St. Louis R. R., 322 Mo. 299, 15 S.W. 2d 825 (1929),
cert. den. 280 U.S. 564 (1929) ; Frye v. Chicago Ry., 157 Minn. 52, 195 N.W.
629 (1923), cert. den. 263 U.S. 723 (1924).
37. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Gex's Estate, 184 Miss. 577, 186 .So.
659 (1939); Allen v. Chicago Great Western R. R., 239 Ill. App. 38 (1925).
[Vol. a
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capacity to produce in another state some appropriate estoppel?
The States are not foreign to each other in the sense of being
completely segregated nations; they are parts of one general
government, one national entity; . . . 38
Lastly, it is often stated that a foreign equity decree will not be
enforced because it might call for an act that is against the public
policy of the second state. And as part of this line of justification, it
is stated that the second forum might be required to give unique re-
lief. As to this, it can first be said that there is doubt whether the
policies in our country vary this much. Therefore, what is allowable
in one state probably would not be against the fundamental concepts
of decency and justice in another. Moreover, the courts stating this
view never stop to see if there would be a violation of public policy
if the decree before it were enforced. Should not the refusal be
limited to those decrees where the act is unlawful in the record state?
Why condemn all decrees merely because of the possibility of being
asked to enforce an order decreeing an unlawful act? With law judg-
ments the Supreme Court has held that public policy is no defense. 9
The mere fact that a determination has been made by a court of equi-
ty, or on the equity side, rather than by a law court, should not weaken
the theory of the Fauntleroy case. Therefore, denial of full faith and
credit should seldom be permitted on the ground that the basis of
the decree violates the policy of the second state. As to the unique
relief point -it is settled that the forum applies its own rules of
procedure. If the procedure existing in the second jurisdiction is
radically different from that of the first, then the suit should be dis-
missed. It is probable that relief would not be sought in the second
state under such circumstances. And if there is no machinery at all
for the enforcement of the foreign decree, then the plaintiff is with-
out recourse. This is now established.
40
As shown above, the assigned reasons for refusing to enforce or-
dinary equity decrees appear to be illogical and unsound. However,
some courts continue their persistency by stating one or more of
them. If the assigned justifications are not the underlying cause for
the dogmatic refusals, what then is it? One is forced to the con-
clusion that it is because of the independent attitude of our judges.
The judges who sit on our courts dislike being bound by the de-
cisions of others. Since a foreign equitable decree does involve a
38. 239 I1. App. 38, 43 (1925)
39. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
40. See note 13 subra.
1955] NOTiES
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judicial determination, the second court, if it abides by the original
decision, is deprived of its right to decide the case on the merits. Per-
haps an enlightened judge would not look upon a determination by
another court as an infringement on his independence. Unfortunate-
ly some of our judges are not so enlightened. The situation was the
same with law judgments. Originally such judicial proceedings were
not enforced, and it was only after a more enlightened outlook was
taken that they were accorded different treatment in some states. In
fact recognition was not accorded in some states until the Supreme
Court required it under Article IV, Section 1, and the federal statute.
The same is true with equity decrees. Only those for which the
Supreme Court has decreed full faith and credit are enforced by
some states. Others realize that in order to administer justice to
litigants a court oftentimes should do more than is required.
There are several solutions to this problem. One is legislation by
Congress which would extend the mandate of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to equity decrees. This is the most desirable solution
because it is Congress that has been given the power to legislate un-
der Article IV, Section 1. However, such legislation is not likely
to be enacted in the near future. Attempts along these lines have
met with no success in the past. A bill proposed by the American
Bar Association included a provision for compulsory respect for the
decree, but this bill was never passed by Congress.41 Another solu-
tion is for the Supreme Court to hand down a firm ruling requiring
faith and credit for equity decrees.
However, unless there is congressional legislation or a definite
holding by the Court some of our states will continue to disregard
equity decrees of sister states.
JAmnS D. SUMNIER, JR.*
41. 52 A.B.A. Rep. 292 (1927).
0 Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. A.B., 1941, Woiford Col-
lege; LL.B., 1949, University of Virgisia; LL.M., 1952, J.S.D. 1955, Yale University.
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